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Abstract Recent developments in the policy sciences emphasize the social environ-
ment in which decisions are made. The ‘network metaphor’ is often used to describe
the key role of interactions between interdependent actors involved in decision
making. These interactions take place in a policy arena drawn up by actors with an
interest in and control over decisions on the issues addressed. Interdependencies,
caused by the need for actors to increase their means of realizing objectives, are
the driving force behind these interactions. Dependency relations are of special
interest to water management and river basin management because of the funda-
mental asymmetrical interdependencies that exist in river basins between upstream
and downstream stakeholders. Coleman’s linear system of action models decision
making process involving dependencies between multiple stakeholders as exchange
of control over issues, while interactions are required to negotiate exchanges of
control. We developed an interactive method for actor analysis based on Coleman’s
linear system of action and applied it to the national rural water management policy
domain in The Netherlands. The method is firmly rooted in mathematical sociology
and defies the criticism that methods for actor and stakeholder analysis do not specify
a theoretical basis explaining the causal relations between the variables analyzed and
policy change. With the application to the rural water management policy arena we
intended to increase our insight into the practical applicability of this analytic method
in an interactive workshop, the acceptability of the approach for the participating
actors, its contribution to the process of decision making and our understanding of
the rural water management policy arena in The Netherlands. We found that the
Association of Water Authorities, the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of
Agriculture are the most powerful actor in the policy domain, while governance and
cost and benefits of rural water management are the most salient issues. Progress
in policy development for rural water management is probably most promising for
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the issues governance, costs and benefits, safety and rural living conditions through
improved interaction between the Association of Water Authorities, the Ministry of
Agriculture and the Rural Credit Bank. Besides these analytic results the interactive
approach implemented increased the participants understanding of their dependency
on other actors in the rural water management policy domain and supported them
in developing a sound perspective on their dependency position. We concluded
that the method developed is acceptable to real-world policy decision makers, can
successfully be applied in an interactive setting, potentially contributes to the process
of decision making by increasing the participants understanding of their dependency
position, has the potential to delivers valuable advice for future decision-making and
increases our understanding of policy development for rural water management in
general.
Keywords Actor analysis · Stakeholder analysis · Policy making ·
Coleman’s social theory · Transactional approach · Negotiation support ·
River basin management
1 Introduction
Policy development for water management in The Netherlands is organized at three
levels. At the national level the Ministry of Public Works and Water Management
drafts the Integrated National Water Management Policy Plan. This plan is guiding
and binding for the Integrated Provincial Water Management and Spatial Policy
Plans, which are translated by the regional water authorities into Regional Integrated
Water Management plans. In the formal policy making process the influence of
the Ministry of Agriculture is limited to the national level, where it acts as an
adviser to the Ministry of Public Works and Water Management in developing the
Integrated National Water Management Policy Plan. The entire procedure, including
the responsibilities and roles of the other ministries, the provinces and the regional
water authorities is formally enacted in the Water Management Act.
Historically water management in rural areas in The Netherlands has been shaped
by the demands of the agricultural sector. Farmers and farmers associations domi-
nated decision making in the regional water boards, provinces carried out extensive
works to improve the infrastructure for agricultural water management and the
Ministry of Agriculture through her program on agricultural land reform and land
reclamation dominated the policy cycle in rural water management from the 1950s
onward. Although ecological and recreational interests gradually strengthened their
influence in the eighties and nineties of the twentieth century, only through the recent
decline of the position of the Dutch agricultural sector, especially diary farming and
arable crop cultivation on the world market, a significant shift in thinking about rural
land and water management took place. According to the Ministry of Agriculture,
The rural area in The Netherlands is under constant pressure. It should provide room
for people to live, work and relax in. But it should also provide opportunities for
economic production and transportation. At the same time valuable nature areas and
unique landscapes should be preserved for future generations. It is therefore of great
importance that the right balance is struck between the various uses of the rural area
(LNV 2000).
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In reaction to current and anticipated developments the ministry drafted two
policy documents. These documents are titled ‘Rural Development Program The
Netherlands 2000–2006’ (LNV 2000) and the ‘The Agenda for a Living Countryside’
(LNV 2004). The first document addresses agricultural issues and focuses on issues of
sustainability and animal health, landscape development and management and also
addresses non- agriculture economic activities. The report highlights the importance
of cooperation with other ministries, authorities and organizations. In addition the
second policy document describes the government’s policy for rural areas for the
years to come. A living countryside and a sustainable agricultural sector are central
to this policy. The Agenda highlights a shift in thinking about rural development and
the role of Ministry of Agriculture and government at large. Before embarking on
the substantial issue of rural development, in this document two chapters out of seven
are used to describe the Dutch and European context and to discuss the shift from
governing to governance in rural development. This shift in approach is clearly illus-
trated in section titles like everyone plays a part used in the document (LNV 2004).
The change in perspective on decision making on rural issues of the Ministry of
Agriculture described can be depicted as a shift from unicentrism to pluricentrism.
According to the unicentric perspective on decision making authorative decisions
are made by one decision maker or by a coherent group and the process of decision
making develops in accordance with the rational comprehensive method (Lindblom
1959). In the network or pluricentric perspective, policies are not seen as the result
of a linear rational process at a central level, but as the result of strategic interaction
processes between multiple interdependent actors (Braybrooke 1974; Kunreuther
et al. 1982; Teisman 1995). These interaction processes do not develop in accordance
with predefined stages, but are better modeled as a series of decision making rounds
played between the actors in the policy domain. A policy domain is a set of actors
with major concerns about the substantive area, here rural water management, whose
preferences and actions on policy events must be taken into account by other domain
participants (Laumann and Knoke 1987). An issue area and a policy arena charac-
terize each decision making round. An issue area is a recognized cluster of concerns
involving interdependence not only among the actors involved but also among the
issues themselves (Haas 1980) while the policy arena is that part of the policy domain
where interaction relating to the issue area takes place (Teisman 1995).
As a result of the developments described above the Ministry of Agriculture felt
a need to increase its participation in the rural water management policy domain. To
facilitate this increased participation the author was hired to implement a participa-
tive actor analysis for the national rural water management policy domain using the
transactional approach (Timmermans 2004; Schouten et al. 2001; Timmermans and
Beroggi 2000).
The use of stakeholder analysis in water management has increased considerably
in recent years and most publications on stakeholder analysis in water management
stem from 2004 onwards (Hermans 2005). However, methods for actor and stake-
holder analysis are often criticized for not specifying a theoretical basis explaining
the causal relations between the variables analyzed and policy change (Crosby 1992;
Meltsner 1972). Also actor and stakeholder analysis in water management are
vulnerable for this criticism. For example, Mylopoulos et al. (2005) incorporate
a stakeholder analysis in their combined approach to transboundary river basin
management. They identified the main stakeholders in the region and their potential
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contribution to river basin management but remain silent on the method for stake-
holder analysis used and how possible contributions of stakeholders are evaluated
(Mylopoulos et al. 2005). Similarly, Olsson and Andersson (2007) discuss the advan-
tages of model based discussions between stakeholders and how the results of such
focused discussions can be improved, with out bringing concept from politics like
power and dependence into the argument.
The transactional approach to actor analysis applied in this paper accommodates
the point of critic stated above, because it is based on a prominent social theory
developed by the American sociologist James S. Coleman (Coleman 1990). Ac-
cording to Coleman’s Social Theory, decision making is to be perceived of as a
negotiation process in which agreements are reached on the exchange of control
over issues between actors in the policy domain. The quantitative implementation
of this theory, the linear system of action (Coleman 1990), captures this exchange
process in a micro-economic model and can be used to analyze the dependency
relations and the exchange process in an empirical policy arena. In addition to
qualitative judgments, the quantitative approach of the LSA facilitates the use of
mathematical analysis to capture otherwise intractable characteristics of the policy
domain analyzed. The importance of dependency relations has also been recognized
in relation to transboundary river basin management. According to van der Zaag
(2007, p. 2001) First of all must there be the realization by riparian states and water
users groups and individuals that they all are dependent on each other, not only now
but also in future.
The method for actor analyses developed in this paper, starts from Coleman’s
observation that exchange in social life can be complicated, for in many areas of social
life institutions to facilitate exchanges of social control (especially those exchanges
that require more than two parties) are not as well developed as are institutions for
the exchange of economic resources (Coleman 1990, pp. 37–38). Supporting policy
decision making should thus focus on a more effective and efficient interaction,
in order to increase exchanges of control. A second observation on which the
approach developed is grounded is Coleman’s realization that in order to implement
exchanges, it is important that actors have a good insight into the distribution of
interest and control (Coleman 1990). Experimental research on multi-actor multi-
issues exchange processes supported these observations. Even in a well-structured
experimental policy arena under conditions of full information, LSA based negoti-
ation support significantly improves performance in identifying and implementing
profitable exchanges of control and similar models have been applied successfully
to predict policy outcomes in Dutch, European and American policy domains
(Timmermans and Beroggi 2004; Timmermans 2004; Stokman and Zeggelink 1996;
Bueno de Mesquita 1994).
2 Method
2.1 The Linear System of Action
Coleman’s social theory explains social development as resulting from exchange of
control over issues between actors and belongs to the group of social theories that
apply exchange theorizing and rational choice theory (Turner 1998). According to
Coleman (1990), any social system exists of actors and issues over which they exercise
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control and in which they have some interest. It is each actor’s interest in issues
under another’s control that lead purposive actors (Weber 1958 [1904]) to engage
in transactions involving exchanges of control. In these transactions actors maximize
their control over issues of their interest. According to Coleman these profitable
exchanges of control are the primary explanatory factor for social development. To
illustrate the argumentative structure embedded in Coleman’s social theory we next
present an example from decision making, where decision makers are characterized
by their interest in and control over an issue and the decision is framed in terms of
exchange of control.
In decision making on the construction of a power plant, the particular electricity
company that wants to invest might depend on the banks to finance the plant while
at the same time it needs a license from the water authority for cooling water, the
provincial government for spatial planning, the local government for environmental
and building licenses and the national government and local fire department for
safety requirements. Furthermore, the location of the plant in the national electricity
network managed by a national authority is relevant, two or three local and regional
environmental groups have concerns, a national lobby group fears the nuclear option
while a local organization of farmers is planning to invest in the production of wind
energy. In this complicated situation the issues at stake reach from environmen-
tal and ecological concerns, safety, profitability, financial and technical feasibility,
reliability of the electricity supply, spatial planning and maybe more. At the same
time these issues are under (shared) control of numerous actors. For examples, the
farmer’s organization might be willing to sell the land for the power plant if they are
granted licenses for the construction of wind turbines and receive the right to connect
to the electricity network and a good price for the electricity produced. At the same
time the water authority opts for air-cooling instead of water-cooling with reference
to ecological concerns, down stream water users and climate change, while spatial
planning and local environmental groups are of the opinion that the industrial image
of cooling towers does not fit the mainly rural setting.
According to Coleman such a complex decision making process can be described
in term of exchange of control. The actors involved need to interact and negotiate
to establish the distributions of control and interest and consequently the value of
control over the issues at stake to come to a decision (Coleman 1990; Timmermans
2004). At the same time an alternative design for the power plant needs to be
developed that incorporates the issues at stake in such a way that the exchange
of control can be operationalized through the implementation of this alternative
(Timmermans 2004).
The linear system of action (LSA) is the formal implementation of this theory
and is based on micro-economic theory and its use of utility theory (Coleman 1990),
but deviates from micro-economic theory in its prescription of a specific form of the
utility function. Micro-economic theory takes a more general approach and proves
that under conditions of positive and declining marginal utility equilibrium exists.1
In addition, Coleman fixes the general shape of the utility function in the LSA
1Micro economic theory does not specify the shape of the utility function. Given the conditions on
the first and second derivative of the utility function, positive contribution to utility and declining
marginal utility, micro-economic theory proves the general existence of equilibrium, as described in
a famous paper by Nash (1950).
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Table 1 Matrices of control C and interest X specifying the LSA
which makes it possible to calculate the competitive equilibrium. The LSA uses a
multiplicative utility function:
Ui = cx1ii1 · cx2ii2 . . . . . . · cxmiim (1)
where Ui is the total utility of actor i, cij is the amount of control over issue j held
by actor i and where x ji, the interest of actor i in issue j, expresses the contribution
that this control makes towards the utility of actor i.2 The variables of the utility
function correspond directly to the basic concepts of the LSA: control over issues, cij,
and interest in issues, x ji. Furthermore in the LSA control and interest are relative
notions and scaled arbitrarily to 1. In matrix notation a LSA for a social system of
n actors and m issues is fully specified by the matrices C and X, the distributions
of control and interest over the actors and the issues (Table 1). According to
Coleman’s’ social theory, all actors engage in exchanges of control in order to
maximize their utility. This exchange process leads to an equilibrium distribution
of control, the competitive equilibrium. The competitive equilibrium for the LSA
with initial control distribution C and distribution of interest X is reached at the
equilibrium distribution of control, C*. A method to calculate C* for a fully specified
LSA is presented in Appendix.
When specified for a specific policy arena, the LSA allows for prescriptive advice
(Timmermans and Beroggi 2004; Timmermans 2004; Stokman and Zeggelink 1996;
Bueno de Mesquita 1994). This advice can however not replace the interaction
processes characterizing policy decision making (Timmermans 2004). We therefore
use the LSA to model decision making in a policy arena and employ the model as
the analytic foundation for an actor analysis workshop. The workshop is designed as
a learning process in which actors are supported in improving their understanding
of the policy arena they are part of. More specifically we direct our efforts on
improving the participants’ insight and understanding of the dependency relations
characterizing their position in the policy arena. We expect that these insights will
contribute to a more efficient identification of profitable exchanges of control and
thus to more effective decision making. The interactive process implemented in
the workshop described in section three of this paper is based on the calculation
2This multiplicative form is also known as a Cobb-Douglas production function and relates produc-
tion to the input of capital and labor. The utility function used by Coleman in the LSA has the same
shape as the Cobb-Douglas production function and control in the LSA is similar to capital while
interest reflects labor.
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of inter actor dependencies. When C and X are known, the matrix of inter actor
dependencies, D, for any LSA can be calculated as:
D = C × X (2)
By the matrix operation of formula (2) for each actor i his or her dependence on
actor j, the entries dij in matrix D, is calculated as actor j’s control over an issue times
the interest of actor i in this issue, summed for all issues; so the higher the control of
actor j over issues in which actor i has an interest the greater the dependence of actor
i on actor j. The concept of inter actor dependence is especially apparent in river
basis management because of the fundamental asymmetrical interdependencies that
exist in river basins between upstream and downstream units. Issue linkage has been
consistently used and proposed to re-balance asymmetric dependency relations in
river basins with erratic success (van der Zaag 2007). An analytic and theoretically
grounded approach to analyzing dependencies as proposed in the transactional
approach can, at least in theory, increase the success of this strategy.
In addition subsequent analytic applications of the LSA described in Sections 3.6
and 3.7 of this paper make use of the calculation of equilibrium control, C*. In
equilibrium all actors have gained maximum control over their most salient issues
and no further profitable exchanges of control between actors exist in the LSA.
In contrast to the matrix of inter-actor dependencies, D, the matrix of equilibrium
control, C*, incorporates the double coincidence of wants required to make an
exchange of control between two actors viable. A method to calculate the matrix
of equilibrium control is presented in Annex A.
The workshop both includes an interactive problem structuring and group mod-
eling process in order to define the LSA, as well as feedback and discussions of
analytic results to facilitate learning. Subsequent analysis of the model based on the
matrix of equilibrium control, C*, addresses the potential for exchange of control, the
distribution of power over the actors and the value of issues. These analysis further
increases our understanding of the policy process and possibly delivers valuable
insights for a more informed continuation of the policy process. More specific the
analysis can be used by the Ministry of Agriculture to develop better strategies for
its participations in the RWM policy arena.
2.2 Defining the LSA
Applying the transactional approach to real world policy arenas requires the def-
inition of an LSA. This definition includes both the structure of the model and a
quantification of the model parameters. The actors and the issues relevant to the
decision problem at hand define the structure of the LSA. Quantifying the LSA
entails the assessment of control of actors over issues and the interest of actors in
issues. These are the matrices C and X as introduced in the section above.
2.2.1 Structuring the LSA
To establish the members of the policy arena to be modeled with the LSA, we follow
a two-step procedure. First the actors belonging to the policy domain are identified.
Second actors belonging to the policy arena are selected. The policy arena contains
a subset of the actors in the policy domain and a subset of the major concerns
addressed. In order to select these actors we first need to define the substantive
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area of concern of the policy domain. This can be a short description of the focus
of attention of the issue area addressed, in this case rural water management in The
Netherlands. Once the substantive boundaries of the policy domain are determined
by specifying its focus of attention, the next task is to identify its empirical members.
For our purpose these are actors that have some control over and some interest in
the policy domain and are thus able and willing to influence decision making.
To identify influential actors four generic approaches, positional, decisional,
reputational and relational have been developed (Knoke 1992). The reputational
approach comes closest to what is needed for the LSA. Reputational methods
identify the actors that are widely believed by knowledgeable observers to actual
have the potential power to move and shake the system. Reputational approaches
start out from the subjective judgments of actors of the reputation of other actors
in the policy domain (Knoke 1992). The approach starts with the identification
of a limited number of key organizations and decision makers, based on their
involvement in related decision processes or appearances in the media.
Next these key actors are asked in a questionnaire to name other organizations
and decision makers with an interest in and control over decision making in the policy
domain. The list is further extended by snowballing the questionnaire. Feedback is
given by including a list of all the organizations and decision makers mentioned and
asking respondents to tick organizations and decision makers they think have an
interest in and control over decision making in the policy domain. The snowballing
procedure stops when no new actors are added to the list and the social network
closes (Scott 2000). The additional criterion to separate organizations and decision
makers belonging to the policy arena from the entire policy domain is the relative
high amount of control and interest of the actors in the policy arena. Organizations
and decision makers named or ticked most frequently as influential or as having
considerable interest belong to the policy arena and are included in the LSA.
2.2.2 Quantifying the LSA
Next, we need to specify in more detail the issues covered by the policy arena. In
Coleman’s (1990) social theory the issues play a role similar to goals or objectives.
They are the intended goals towards which the actors act purposively. Value-focused
thinking (Keeney 1992) is an interactive problem-structuring method that explicitly
incorporates goal- or objective-oriented behavior. In this framework, Keeney defines
objectives as a statement of something that one desires to achieve, while fundamental
objectives are essential reasons for interest in the decision situation that guide
the effort of actors (Gregory and Keeney 1994; Keeney 1992). Both objectives
and fundamental objectives are characterized by a decision context, an object and
a direction of preference and are contingent to the decision situation (Keeney
1992). Value-focused thinking (VFT) includes a set of methods that can be used to
articulate fundamental objectives in decision making through an interactive process
of identifying, structuring, analyzing and understanding objectives.
The next step in completing the LSA is to determine the initial distributions
of control and the distribution of interest. Both are matrices with entries for all
actors and all issues. The entries in the control matrix C, cij, depict the control of
actor i over issue j. The interest matrix X consists of the entries x ji, the interest
of actor i in issue j. To complete the LSA we have to elicit values for all cij and
x ji. In contrast to the parameters of a general utility function, the constants x ji in
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the LSA have a specific meaning, as they reflect the interest of actors over issues.
This makes it possible to elicit x ji’s by asking assessees directly for their interest in
issues. Similarly’ control has a specific meaning in the context of the LSA, which
can be explained to the assessees and thus elicited directly. These characteristics
of cij and x ji make it possible to use descriptive assessment methods to elicit their
value. Descriptive methods usually employ variations of paired comparison in order
to derive a complete strong preference order of the attributes, are normally computer
supported and therefore easy to implement in an interactive group setting. Examples
are the analytic hierarchy process (Saaty 1980, 1996) and interactive preference
ordering (Beroggi 1999, 2000). We applied Interactive Preference Ordering and
used the statistic dominance method (Rietveld and Ouwersloot 1992) to calculate
preference intensities from the resulting ordinal data.
3 Results and Discussion
This section describes and discusses an application of the transactional approach
to the rural water management (RWM) policy arena in The Netherlands. With
this interactive actor analysis the Ministry of Agriculture intended to increase their
knowledge of the actors in the RWM policy domain in a systematic and action
oriented way. Our intervention included an actor analysis workshop based on the
transactional approach. The design of the workshop is to a large extent determined
by the use of the LSA. Most of the freedom in the design is related to the way
the results of the LSA are conveyed to the actors. We used dependencies between
actors as the focus of discussion. According to the transactional approach only after
exchange rates are established and profitable exchanges identified can exchanges
of control be made. A good insight of the actors in the dependency relations in
the policy arena supports them in identifying profitable exchanges of control and
establishing exchange rates (Timmermans 2004; Timmermans and Beroggi 2000;
Coleman 1990). The importance of dependency relations has also been recognized
in relation to transboundary river basin management (van der Zaag 2007 p. 2001).
The workshop included eight activities. The duration and timing of the activities
are given in Table 2. The remaining time is used to receive and introduce the actors
and for lunch and coffee breaks. Activities 1, 3 and 6 are required to structure and
quantify the LSA. Results of activity 5 are used as a reference for the discussion of
activity 7. Finally the workshop is evaluated.
Table 2 Workshop program
Nr. Activity Timing
1 Selection of actors 2 months before actual workshop
2 Introduction to the transactional approach 9:30–9:55, 25 min
3 Introduction to rural water management 09:55–10:15, 20 min
4 Structuring the issues 10:30–12:00, 1 h 30 min
5 Modeling dependencies 13:00–13:30, 30 min
6 Quantifying interest and control 13:30–14:00, 30 min
7 Discussing dependencies 14:15–15:45, 1 h 30 min
8 Evaluation of the workshop 15:45–16:00, 15 min
J. Timmermans
3.1 Selection of Actors
The selection of actors was done well before the start of the workshop. It is included
in the workshop design because it is an integral part of the transactional approach.
The snowballing questionnaire used to identify the actors to be invited to the
workshop and to be included in the LSA posed two questions:
1. In the following table, organizations or departments of organizations approached
in this questionnaire to date are listed. Please tick the parties who in your opinion
have a considerable interest in and influence on the development of the rural
water system in the light of current trends in rural development?
2. Which organizations or departments of organizations not listed to date do in your
opinion have a considerable interest in and influence on the development of the
rural water system in the light of current trends in rural development?
The first question was followed by a list of respondents that was updated after
every new round of the snowballing procedure. The questionnaire ended with a
polite request for a reply within ten days of receipt. With the questionnaire, the re-
spondents received a program for the workshop and background information on the
selection of organizations and decision makers. The questionnaire was initially sent
to three key organizations selected by a representative of Ministry of Agriculture.
A total of 21 questionnaires where distributed of which 18 where returned by the
respondents (response rate 86%). The organizations listed ranged from agricultural
organization and the national organization of water authorities to the Rabobank, a
bank rooted in agricultural financing.
To keep the number of paired comparisons and interpretation of the graphical
presentation of the resulting dependencies manageable the number of actors and
issues, and thus the size of the matrices X and C need to be limited. We therefore
grouped all the parties into nine ‘actors’. The actor groups are arranged so as
to be homogeneous regarding their interest in rural water management. For this
workshop all nature and environmental NGO’s are clustered in one actor, also actors
related to spatial planning are regarded as one actor and so are different institutions
belonging to the Ministry of Public Works. Consultants and knowledge organization
that function as advisers to relevant actors are not included as separate actors in
the LSA model. Table 3 lists the actors drawing up the LSA model of the RWM
policy arena. In the workshop all these actors where represented by one individual.
All remaining respondents to the questionnaire were invited to join the agenda
Table 3 Actors and issues of the LSA model of the RWM policy arena
Nr Actors Issues
1 Spatial planning Sustainable governance
2 Automotive and Tourism Association Sustainable management
3 Ministry of Public Works Sustainable use
4 Agricultural Association Safety
5 Rural Credit Bank Rural living conditions
6 Association of Water Authorities Societal costs and benefits
7 Association of Water supply Companies
8 Natural and Environment Associations
9 Ministry of Agriculture
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committee and where dully informed on both planning, program, participants and
results of the workshop.
3.2 Structuring the issues
The policy arena was further structured in an interactive setting, using value-focused
thinking (VFT). The actors were first asked individually to list at least five objectives
prominent in relation to developments in RWM. The participants jotted these objec-
tives on sticky notes. After finishing the inventory of objectives, a second identical
set of sticky notes with the objectives was prepared. The participants where than
divided into two sub-groups, each group receiving a set of all objectives. Sub-groups
were asked to first remove redundant objectives and than to develop a structure of
fundamental objectives by clustering. It was explained to the participants that the
structure should be based on the reasons why the objectives are important. The goal
of the exercise was further stressed by making clear that actors should be able to
compare the fundamental objectives in terms of their interest for their organization.
The results of the sub-groups where integrated into one set of fundamental objectives
in a group-session supported by a facilitator. The VFT process yielded a total of six
fundamental objectives (Table 3), resulting from an initial set of 74 objectives. The
fundamental objectives ranged from safety against flooding to the societal costs and
benefits of rural water management.
3.3 Modeling Dependencies
In this and the next step of the workshop a wireless network of laptop computers with
dedicated software is used. All actors are seated behind a table and use an interactive
visual tool to model their individual perception of the dependency relations within
the policy arena. The modeling tool resembles a centralized bi-directional sociogram3
as used by sociologists to depict social networks (Scott 2000). The thickness of the
arrows indicates the dependency of the actor at the end of the arrow on the actor at
the head of the arrow. For an example of the lay out of this modeling tool see Fig. 1.
Each participant is confronted with a sociogram in which his or her organization is the
actor in the centre. The sociometric star contains in- and outgoing arrows from the
centre actor to the outer actor and vise versa. At the start of the modeling session all
arrows have equal thicknesses reflecting a fully balanced dependency structure. We
asked participants to model their perception of their dependence on the other actors
and the other way around in achieving their objectives by using the computer mouse
to increase or decrease the thickness of the arrows. The results of the individual
modeling of dependencies are saved to the network server for use in step five of
the workshop.
3.4 Quantifying Interest and Control
To quantify interest and control we applied Interactive Preference Ordering
(Beroggi 1999, 2000). The method uses computer supported paired comparisons and
3In fact we use a specific version of the sociogram, namely the sociometric star.
J. Timmermans
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
overestimation
underestimation
2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
overestimation
underestimation
3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
overestimation
underestimation
9
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
overestimation
underestimation
a b
c d
Fig. 1 Individual and system dependencies compared. a Spatial planning (1). b Automotive and
Tourism Association (2). c Ministry of Public Works (3). d Ministry of Agriculture (9)
transitive inferences to derive a complete strong preference order for both interest
and control. The method is integrated in the software used in the previous step and
the participants are still seated behind their laptop computers. From the resulting
ordinal data, preference intensities are calculated using the statistic dominance
method (Rietveld and Ouwersloot 1992). The results of all actors are saved to the
network-server and are used to build the LSA model and calculate the equilibrium
distribution of control, C*, and the matrix of inter-actor dependencies, D. The
resulting LSA, defined by its actors, issues and the distribution of interest, X, and
the distribution of control, C, is presented in Table 4.
3.5 Discussing Dependencies
This part of the workshop is designed to stimulate learning in terms of inter-actor
dependencies and facilitate the participants in developing a sound perspective on
their dependency position in the RWM policy arena. For the discussion participants
are seated behind tables in u-shape with a projection screen in front of the group.
The discussions are based on the dependencies calculated with the LSA and the
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Table 4 Parameters for the LSA model of the RWM policy arena
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total
X
Governance 0.13 0.10 0.41 0.24 0.40 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.40 2.02
Management 0.25 0.16 0.10 0.27 0.15 0.32 0.24 0.23 0.15 1.87
Use 0.17 0.06 0.06 0.27 0.27 0.10 0.16 0.27 0.27 1.63
Safety 0.12 0.41 0.24 0.11 0.03 0.35 0.03 0.07 0.03 1.40
Living conditions 0.21 0.24 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.27 0.10 1.07
Costs and benefits 0.12 0.03 0.16 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.41 0.04 0.06 1.01
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 9.00
C′
Governance 0.21 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 1.00
Management 0.17 0.07 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.07 1.00
Use 0.17 0.21 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 1.00
Safety 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.10 1.00
Living conditions 0.11 0.18 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.10 1.00
Costs and benefits 0.21 0.20 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.03 1.00
Total 0.98 0.91 0.87 0.77 0.68 0.48 0.46 0.43 0.42 6.00
individual assessments of dependencies derived in step 3. In the following discussion
actors are both referred to by their name as well as a number for easy reference to
the entries in Tables 4 and 5 and Fig. 1.
3.5.1 System Dependencies
Discussions based on the system dependencies as presented in Table 5 touched
upon the importance of spatial planning (1) for rural water management. According
to Table 5 the total dependence for all actors is highest for spatial planning (1).
These results are in line with the current reframing of water management issues
in The Netherlands. In this process of reframing the paradigm shift from sectoral
to integrated water management is bolstered by a growing focus on the ecological,
cultural and visual quality of the water system itself and the practice that water
management facilitates spatial functions gives way for the principle that spatial
functions have to adapt to the water system. This new paradigm strengthens the
position of the water system and water management, however, the growing ambitions
Table 5 Dependencies for column actors on row actors based on the LSA
D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total
1 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.18 1.56
2 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.14 1.40
3 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.16 1.33
4 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 1.16
5 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 1.02
6 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.67
7 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.70
8 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.59
9 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.57
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 9.00
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for the water system at the same time results in an increase in the dependency of
water management and the water system on spatial planning. The surprisingly low
dependence of rural water management on the Ministry of Agriculture (9) is in line
with this development. In the shift from sectoral to integral thinking about water
systems, the influence of the agricultural sector is declining and it is not any longer
standard practice to adapt the management of water systems to the agricultural
function of rural areas only. This development also results in an increase of the
importance of the Automotive and Tourism Association (2), representing recreation
and tourism ambitions. The high dependence on the Ministry of Public Works (3)
is attributed to its position in protecting The Netherlands against flooding from
both sea and rivers. Safety remains a strong argument in decision making on water
management. It is accepted that the water system can be adapted and transformed to
fit diverse ambitions as long as safety is not endangered.
Some remarks made by the participants in the discussion on the system level
dependencies reflect the perception of participants on decision making. A number
of participants emphasized the role of formal politics and policy and state that these
are missing in the model, while others think that the role of the Association of Water
Authorities (6) is stronger than depicted as they can influence developments at the
level of day-to-day water management and implementation of construction works,
bypassing the formal policy and political system. This type of remarks highlight
some of the more difficult aspects of the transactional approach used. The model
starts from the assumption that subjective perception of the dependency relations
are leading. For example, an actor that perceives a high influence of Nature and
Environmental Organizations (8) on decision making on rural water management
because they receive considerable political support at the national level, will make
sure that Nature and Environmental Organizations (8) are involved in the decision
making process. The transactional approach does not overlook these influences but
incorporates them through the perceptions of the members of the policy arena. For
some of the participants this aspect of the transactional approach is difficult to grasp.
However, learning in the workshop also included the general notion of dependency
relations and their importance for decision making as well as contingent discussions
on dependencies in the RWM policy arena.
From the issues addressed, the remarks made by the participants and the progress
of the discussion we concluded that the concepts underlying the method for actor
analysis used were generally well taken. Participants used the concepts of the
transactional approach to discuss specific dependency relations of actors, criticized
the results and discussed the approach itself. The implicit representation of the
formal policy and political system, however, remained an issue.
3.5.2 Individual Dependencies
The dependencies calculated with the LSA as discussed above are called system
dependencies. The individual estimates derived in step 5 of the workshop are
labeled individual dependencies. These data are similar to the data of Table 5 but
differ in values for each actor as they reflect individual perceptions. The difference
between individual and system dependencies gives an impression of the capability
of the participants to appraise the dependency position of their organization in the
RWM policy arena. By confronting individual perceptions of dependency relations
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(individual dependencies) with dependencies calculated with the LSA (system de-
pendencies), we intended to make the participants aware of the presence of diverging
perceptions of dependencies and show them how this influences their interaction in
the policy arena. In the worse case two members do not interact because they do
not perceive a dependency on each other and thus do not have an urge to interact.
In addition it is likely that members of the policy arena that perceive a strong
dependence on one or more of the other members invests time and effort in a relation
that is not reprociated. As a result of this learning process we expect participants to
re-evaluate their perception of the dependency relations, identify new opportunities
for cooperation and adjust their interaction and negotiation behavior accordingly.
To facilitate the discussion the differences between individual and system depen-
dencies are calculated for each actor and the results are presented on the projection
screen using a graphical interface similar to the one used for modeling the individual
dependencies. However, in this case the weight of the arrows does not indicate
dependence but the difference between individual and systems dependencies and
their pattern full or dashed, signifies the under (dashed) or over (full) estimation of
dependencies by the individual actors (see Fig. 1).
In Fig. 1 dependence of the central actor on the other actors is represented
by the outgoing arrows and the dependence of the other actors on the central
actor is depicted by the incoming arrows. Full arrows indicate an overestimation
of the dependency relation by the central actor, while dashed arrows indicate an
underestimation of the dependency relation. The thickness of the arrow reflects the
magnitude of the over or underestimation. So in Fig. 1 a the full arrow running from
actor 5 to actor 2 in the centre indicates that actor 2 overestimates the dependency
of actor 5 on actor 2. In the continuation of the workshop the discussion focused on
the differences between individual and system level dependencies. Underneath we
present some of the more interesting results and related discussions.
Figure 1a compares individual and system dependencies for spatial planning (1).
In general spatial planning (1) slightly underestimates the dependence of other actors
on spatial planning and the other way around. Only for the Automotive and Tourism
Association (2) and Association of Water Supply Companies (7) an overestimation
of the dependencies by spatial planning (1) occurs, probably because recreation and
mobility and drinking water supply are both sectors with a clear and substantial
spatial claim sustained by longstanding policies. A remarkable underestimation
is found for the dependence of spatial planning on the Rural Credit Bank. This
underestimation is probably due to the relative unacquaintedness of these two orga-
nizations. Because spatial planning (1) operates in the realm of government distant
from individual farmers, the Rural Credit Bank (5) operates close to individual
farmers and the two do not easily meet. Some more insight on the interdependence
of spatial planning (1) and the Rural Credit Bank (5) can be found in Table 5.
From Table 5 it appears that both actors have a relatively high interdependence, 0.18
for the dependence of the Rural Credit bank (5) on spatial planning (2) and 0.12 for
the reciprocal relation. This relatively high interdependence probably results from
the intimate relation between the Rural Credit Bank and Dutch farmers. The banks
is omnipresent in Dutch rural areas and many farmers depend to a large extend on
loans from this bank to finance their activities. In practice this means that without the
involvement of and consent of the Rural Credit Bank (5) farmers are unable to invest
in new technologies or an increase of scale. For example when farmers need to invest
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in manure management to improve ground and surface water quality, the Rural
Credit Bank (5) is likely to be called upon in order to finance these investments.
Spatial planning makes a nearly perfect estimate of the dependency relation with the
Ministry of Agriculture (9), probably because historically planning responsibilities in
rural areas have been shared with the Ministry of Agriculture (9).
In conclusion, spatial planning does have a realistic perception of its position in the
RWM policy arena, only for the Rural Credit bank (5) a significant underestimation
occurs. These results reflect the traditional position of the spatial planning sector
and its need to interact with many parties in planning exercises. It seems likely
that an increased interaction between spatial planning and the Rural Credit Bank
can substantially further rural development in relation to spatial panning and its
consequences for rural water management.
Figure 1b presents the individual and system dependencies for the Automotive
and Tourism Association (2). This organization is mainly an automotive association,
but has a growing interest in recreation and tourism. In the workshop the association
is represented by their department of recreation. From Fig. 1b is appears that the
Automotive and Tourism Association in general overestimates its dependency on
other actors and the dependency of the other actors on the Automotive and Tourism
Association (in and out going full arrows). Only for governmental organizations like
the Association of Water Authorities (6) and the Ministry of Agriculture (9) the
Automotive and Tourism Association (2) slightly underestimates its dependency.
The biggest overestimations are found for the dependencies of the Automotive
and Tourism Association (2) on the Agricultural Association (4) and the Natural
and Environment Associations (8) on the Automotive and Tourism Association (2).
While the Automotive and Tourism Association (2) overestimates the dependencies
of non-governmental institutions like the Agricultural Association (4) and Natural
and Environment Associations (8) on Automotive and Tourism Association (2), it
underestimates its dependency on governmental organization like the Association of
Water Authorities (6) and the Ministry of Agriculture (9).
It seems that the Automotive and Tourism Association (2) does not have great
fate in the influence of governmental organizations on water management in rural
areas and that they look at non-governmental organizations to take the lead. An
increase of their interaction and trust in governmental institution however could
help to realize their goals. It seems that this process has already started, seen their
participation in this workshop.
Figure 1c presents the individual and system dependencies in the RWM policy
arena for the Ministry of Public Works (3). The Ministry of Public Works (3) is
represented by their water management department, which has formal responsi-
bilities in water management and flood protection. The most apparent impression
from Fig. 1c is the huge underestimation of the dependence of the other actors
on the Ministry of Public Works (3) (incoming dashed arrows) and, to a lesser
extend, also its dependence on other actors. Only for organizations that belong to
their direct formal network in the government system, like spatial planning (1),
the Association of Water Authorities (6) and the Ministry of Agriculture (9) the
Ministry of Public Works (3) overestimates its dependency. The representative for
Ministry of Public Works (3), confronted with this representation, reacted by stating
that the model does not include the political system and that non governmental
organization exercise their influence their. The representative of the Agricultural
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Association (4) remarked that it could be worthwhile to improve the relation with the
Agricultural Association (4) because its members own the larger share of the land in
rural areas and are thus an important factor in both water management and spatial
planning. Opposite to the Automotive and Tourism Association (2), the Ministry
of Public Works (3) has a strong confidence in the influence of the formal political
system and does not perceive cooperation with non-governmental organizations or
cooperation in general as important. The observations made above will probably
result in a defensive or uninterested attitude towards interaction in the policy arena.
This conclusion fits the longstanding impression that the Ministry of Public Works
(3) is a closed and hierarchical organization. In practice this means that cooperation
between the Automotive and Tourism Association (2) and the Ministry of Public
Works (3) in the area of rural water management does not seem very likely while
their dependence on each other is relatively high (0.18 and 0.14 respectively for the
dependency of Automotive and Tourism Association (2) on the Ministry of Public
Works (3) and from Ministry of Public Works (3) on the Automotive and Tourism
Association (2), see also Table 4).
In Fig. 1d the individual and system level dependencies for the Ministry of
Agriculture (9) are given. The ministry represents agriculture as an economical
sector and has formal responsibilities for planning in rural areas, including the
water system. Traditionally the ministry strongly focused on agricultural interests.
Recent development in the economical strength of the sector has caused a shift
in focus of the ministry form agriculture to rural development. From Fig. 1d it
appears that the Ministry of Agriculture (9) perceives a strong dependence on spatial
planning (1) and the Agricultural Association (4), their natural partner in the high
days of agricultural development. At the same time the Ministry of Agriculture
(9) underestimates the dependence of the Automotive and Tourism Association
(2), the Association of Water Authorities (6) and the Association of Water supply
Companies (7). As a result the Ministry of Agriculture (2) will not be inclined to
react positive on interactions with the Association of Water Authorities (6) and
the Association of Water Supply Companies (7) in relation to spatial planning and
water management. Furthermore from the dashed arrows between the Ministry
of Agriculture (9) and itself, indicating self-dependency, it appears that the Min-
istry of Agriculture (2) significantly underestimates its own position in rural water
management. The Ministry of Agriculture (9) feels that it is not in a position to
make a difference in this field. Both from the results of the model of dependencies
and the discussions it can be concluded that the Ministry of Agriculture (2) still
operates from its historical agricultural perspective and has not really internalized the
consequences of a more integrated approach in rural water management. Although it
perceives a strong dependence on Spatial Planning it does not incorporate resulting
dependencies of other actors on the ministry of Agriculture (9) in relation to water
management. It seems that the Ministry of Agriculture (2) regards integrating non-
agricultural objectives in rural water management as additional to agricultural water
management and not as an objective in itself, requiring substantial adaptations in
agricultural practices in rural water management.
From the analysis of the dependency relations for the RWM policy arena we
conclude that diverging perceptions on dependencies exist. In the case of the ministry
of Public Works (3), this is the result of a difference in perception of the process of
decision making. The ministry of Public Works (3) has a unicentric perception of
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policy making with a key role for governmental institutions. In other cases these
reflect a limited insight in the actual dependency relations in the policy arena.
Especially representatives of governmental institutions like the Ministry of Public
Works (3) and the Ministry of Agriculture (9) show larger differences between
system dependencies and their individual dependencies and in general underestimate
dependencies. Besides from a stronger believe in the formal political system this
probably stems from a limited sensitivity to the pluricentric features of current policy
making. Non governmental organizations, like the Automotive and Tourism Associ-
ation (2) generally overestimate dependency relations. Spatial Planning generally has
an accurate perception of its position in the RWM policy arena, probably because of
its need to integrate the interests of many stakeholders affected by spatial planning
in rural areas.
The perspectives on the dependency relations in the RWM policy arena diverge
to a great extend. Participants in the workshop probably have different ideas on
the required amount of interaction and on the practical implementation of this
interaction, via the formal political system or in direct interaction with stakeholders.
From the pluricentric perspective, it is clear that governmental institution need to
open up and increase their interaction with non governmental actors, learn how to
arrive at a more realistic perception of their position in the decision making process
and open up to a role as co-producer of policies. Some of the non-governmental
organizations need to increase their interaction with governmental actors and take
the formal structures for decision making more serious.
Further analysis of the LSA in the next section, aims to arrive at a better
understanding of the RWM policy arena. First the value of the issues and the
distribution of power over the actors are addressed, second we discuss the remaining
potential for exchange of control and thirdly the identification of clusters of actors
and issues that comprise relatively large amounts of potential exchange of control are
discussed. The first two analyses mainly increase our insight in the policy arena while
the third analysis delivers practical advice on the continuation of the policy process.
3.6 Value of Issues and Power of Actors
From the LSA model of the RWM policy arena, the value vector, v, and the power
vector, r, can be calculated (see Appendix). The value vector v, an m × 1 vector,
where m equals the number of issues, expresses the value of each issue in the LSA.
From Table 6 it appears that governance, in the sense that the actors involved
Table 6 Distributions of value over issues and power over actors
Actor Power [–] Issue Value [–]
Spatial planning 0.15 Governance 0.23
Automotive and Tourism Association 0.07 Management 0.17
Ministry of Public Works 0.16 Use 0.17
Agricultural Association 0.11 Safety 0.11
Rural Credit Bank 0.06 Living conditions 0.11
Association of Water Authorities 0.18 Costs and benefits 0.21
Association of Water supply Companies 0.07
Natural and Environment Associations 0.08
Ministry of Agriculture 0.13
Total 1.00 1.00
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are able to coordinate their actions and make and implement decisions related to
rural water management, is considered the most valuable issue. This is in line with
current developments in rural water management. The overriding influence of the
agricultural sector on water management is diminishing and step by step replaced
by a plurality of actors and interests complicating coordinated action. That cost and
benefits of rural water management scores second is also related to developments
in the agricultural sector. Agricultural interest is historically the prime motivation
for investments in rural water management and agriculture income constituted
the economical backbone of the rural areas. Now the economical strength of the
agriculture sector is waning, the economic future of rural areas and meeting the costs
of management and maintenance of rural areas are at stake.
The power vector r, an n × 1 vector where n equals the number of actors, is
derived from the value vector. The power of an actor equals the sum the control
of an actor over each issue multiplied by the value of that issue (Coleman 1990):
ri =
m∑
j=1
cijv j (3)
Power in the LSA thus becomes a subjective concept as it not only depends on
the control actors have over recourses but also on the interest of other actors in
that resource. For the RWM policy arena the power of the actors are distributed as
presented in Table 6.
The distribution of power over the actors can also be analyzed in the light
of current developments in the agricultural sector. In line with the high value of
governance, the Union of Water Authorities is perceived to be the most powerful
actor. Water authorities, traditionally strongly related to the agricultural sector, are
rapidly broadening their scope and integrating other sectors in their administrative
and financial procedures and in their water management policies. Together with
the Ministry of Public Works they are believed to be able to deliver the required
integrative and coordinating power required to address current issues in rural water
management. The relatively high power attributed to actors in the spatial planning
cluster highlights the growing influence of other sectors on rural water management.
Traditionally the agricultural sector determined courses of action, while nowadays
recreation and tourism, ecological and real estate interests exert a significant and
growing influence on rural water management. Actors in the spatial planning sector
are expected to solve the tension between these interests by developing and imple-
menting effective spatial arrangements.
3.7 Potential for Exchange of Control
The increase in the number of actors and issues related to rural water management
in The Netherlands resulted in a growing complexity of decision making on these
issues. In the LSA this growing complexity is reflected as an increase in possible
exchanges of control, making the identification of profitable exchanges of control
by the relevant actors more problematic. In the LSA this increase is expressed as
combinatory complexity. With two actors and two issues, four possible exchange
relations exists, while for a model of three actors and three issues this number
increases to 36. For the LSA model of the RWM policy arena the number of
exchange relations equals 2,160. In general the number of exchange relations, p,
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equals the number of permutations of two out of n actor’s times the number of
permutations of two issues out of m issues:
p = n!
(n − 2)! ·
m!
(m − 2)! (4)
Combinatorial complexity is only one element of total complexity and does in
now way reflect complexity of real world decision making. However, experimental
research has shown that even in the case that complexity is limited to combinatorial
complexity identifying profitable exchanges of control seriously exceeds the cognitive
capacity of humans (Timmermans and Beroggi 2004). The same research proved
that reduction of combinatorial complexity helps actors in identifying profitable
exchanges of control (Timmermans and Beroggi 2004). In real world policy arena’s,
combinatorial complexity can be reduced by defining sub-arena’s of a limited number
of actors and a limited number of issues including a relatively large remaining
potential for exchange of control. This information can be used to inform the decision
making process in such a way that interaction in the policy arena is concentrated
in these sub-arena’s in order to increase the likelihood of identifying profitable
exchanges of control. This can for example be achieved by using these sub-arenas’s
as focused groups in workshop settings. Table 7 gives an overview of these sub-
arenas for the RWM policy arena. The hypotheses behind this approach is that the
focused attention will result in alternatives that are not only substantially interesting
but also fit the interest of the participating actors and are therefore more promising
for further decision making. Further research is required to validate this approach.
The remaining potential for exchange of control is a measure for the distance of
the exchange system from equilibrium. At equilibrium all actors have maximized
their control over all issues and no further possibilities for profitable exchange of
control remain in the system. If this is the case, the decision making process is locked
and no further progress on the issues with the available actors can be expected. In
such a case ‘dialogues of the death’ (van Eeten 1999) prevail.
Remaining potential for exchange of control at time t, tcφ , is calculated as a
percentage relative to the maximum potential for exchange of control, thus:
tcφ =
⎡
⎣
∑
ij
∣∣∣c∗ij − tcij
∣∣∣
/
∑
ij
∣∣∣c∗ij − 0cij
∣∣∣
⎤
⎦ × 100% (5)
Table 7 Sub-arena’s with high potential for exchange of control
Nr Cφ Actors Issues
1 0.024 Rural Credit Bank Governance
Association of Water Authorities Safety
Ministry of Agriculture
2 0.016 Automotive and Tourism Association Safety
Association of Water supply Companies Living conditions
Costs and benefits
3 0.013 Agricultural Association Governance
Natural and Environment Associations Living conditions
4 0.012 Spatial Planning Governance
Ministry of Public Works Living conditions
Management
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where tcφ is the distribution of control when the system is as far as possible out of
equilibrium and c∗ij is the equilibrium distribution of control. For the RWM policy
arena, tcφ equals 31%. This is relatively high. Other applications of the transactional
approach resulted in values of 26% (Timmermans 2004), 19% (Timmermans and
Beroggi 2000), 23% (Timmermans 2001). A relatively high value of tcφ indicates
that the decision making process is far from completed and further progress can be
made when the actors continue their interactions, re-evaluate their perceptions of
the dependency relations and continue to explore possible profitable cooperation’s.
3.8 Evaluation of the Workshop
The workshop was evaluated in an open discussion. Participants where asked about
their experience in workshop and their opinion on the transactional approach.
Participants stated that the workshop increased their insight in the dependency
relation within the RWM policy arena, but did not help them to come to grip with
substantial issues related to rural water management. Furthermore the workshop
and the transactional approach assisted them in acquiring a systems perspective and
a long term view of policy development in the RWM policy arena. The clustering
of organization involved in spatial planning at the municipal, provincial and national
level in one actor, spatial planning, for the LSA model was not deemed adequate.
Participants advised to involve these organizations as separate actors in a possible
follow up of the workshop. Furthermore the position of spatial planning as the most
powerful actor became an issue. Some participants commented that the power of
spatial planning in the RWM policy arena is considerable lower than calculated with
the LSA because their activities are not bolstered by budget and that spatial planning
is depending on sectoral interests for investments. This discussion is comparable
to the discussion on the role of formal procedures in policy-making and the role
of the informal pluricentric aspects staged by the representative of the Ministry
of Public Works earlier in the workshop. The conclusion however remains that
spatial planning is perceived as the most powerful actor because of the subjective
perspectives of the other actors. Only when these actors internalize the notion that
the power of spatial planning is restricted due to its limited investment power will the
power of spatial planning calculated with the LSA decline.
4 Conclusions
In this paper an interactive approach to actor analysis based on Coleman’s linear sys-
tem of action was developed and applied to the rural water management policy arena
in The Netherlands. The linear system of action for the rural water management
policy arena was structured and quantified in a workshop using a computer network
and dedicated software and employed to perform an interactive actor analysis. With
this application we intended to increase our insight into the practical applicability of
this analytic method in an interactive workshop, the acceptability of the approach for
the participating actors, the identification of its contribution to the process of decision
making and its contribution to our understanding of the rural water management
policy arena in The Netherlands. The importance of dependency relations has also
been recognized in relation to transboundary river basin management, especially in
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relation to the fundamental asymmetry of dependency relations encountered in river
basins.
According to Coleman a complex decision making process can be described in
term of exchange of control. The actors involved need to interact and negotiate
to establish the distributions of control and interest and consequently the value of
control over the issues at stake to come to a decision (Coleman 1990; Timmermans
2004). The linear system of action is the formal implementation of this theory and
is based on micro-economic theory and its use of utility theory (Coleman 1990). A
linear system of action for a social system of n actors and m issues is fully specified
by the matrices C and X, the distributions of control and interest over the actors
and the issues. In terms of the transactional approach a policy arena is that part of a
policy network that offers opportunities for exchanges of control. The actor analysis
is used to support actors in identifying profitable exchanges of control. This support
is offered both by discussing dependency relations between the actors as well as by
analytically identifying these exchanges in the linear system of action and use the
results to inform the decision making process.
Applying the transactional approach requires the definition of the linear system
of action for the relevant policy arena. This definition includes both the structure of
the model and a quantification of the model parameters. The actors and the issues
pertinent to the decision problem at hand define the structure of the linear system
of action. Quantifying the linear system of action requires the assessment of control
of actors over issues and the interest of actors in issues, the matrices C and X of
the linear system of action. Structuring the issues emerged as the most intensive
and difficult element of the workshop. Participants come up with a multitude of
different structures at the start and redefine them or developed new structures in
the process. Quantifying the linear system of action in a workshop setting using a
computer network and dedicated software proved to be a straightforward activity.
The participants did not experience problems with the paired comparisons of the
issues in order to quantify interest and control. From the discussions in the workshop
it appeared that the meaning of the issues was clear and that the issues were
perceived as sufficiently independent and comparable. The assessment of control
turned out to be an intensive but straightforward activity. Questions regarding this
activity were mainly related to the meaning of control. A number of participants
asked if control should be interpreted as the formal role of an actor in the decision
making process. This question was answered by explaining that all kinds of control
could be included and that the participants’ own perception of their importance
should be followed.
In the workshop extensive discussions on the dependency relations based on the
linear system of Action took place. In the evaluation of the workshop the participants
stated that their insight in the dependency relations in the policy arena increased, that
the workshop supported them in acquiring a systems perspective including all actors.
These contributions can be attributed to the use of the linear system of action and
indicate that its use had an additional value in the workshop. Actors also commented
that they did not learn on the substance of rural water management, which is also
a consequence of the use of the transactional approach as the issues are necessarily
addressed in a general sense.
Other contributions were more concerned with the discussions between the
participants. Although these discussions were based on the results of the linear
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system of action, they cannot be attributed uniquely to it. Most of these contributions
were linked to the roles of the actors in the decision making process and could also
have been achieved in open discussions. However, the design of the workshop, the
selection of participants and the use of the Linear System of Action seemed to create
the right setting for this type of discussion to unfold.
From the further analyses of the linear system of action it appeared that the
remaining potential for exchange of control in the rural water management policy
arena at the time of the workshop equals 31%, indicating that the decision making
process is far from completed and further progress can be made. Other applications
of the transactional approach resulted in values of around 20%.
The distributions of power and the value of the issues reflect recent development
in rural water management in The Netherlands. Governance, in the sense that the
actors involved are able to coordinate their actions and make and implement decision
related to rural water management, is considered the most valuable issue. This is in
line with developments in rural water management in The Netherlands, where the
overriding influence of the agricultural sector on water management is diminishing
while the growing plurality of actors and interests complicate coordinated action.
The distribution of power over the actors can also be analyzed in the light
of current developments in the rural water management. The Ministry of Public
Works and the Union of Water Authorities are perceived to be the most powerful
actors. Both are rapidly broadening their scope and integrating other sectors in their
administrative and financial procedures and in their water management policies.
They are believed to be able to deliver the required integrative and coordinating
power required to address current issues. The relatively high power attributed to
spatial planning highlights the growing influence of other sectors on rural water
management. In the same line, the power attributed to the Ministry of Agriculture is
relatively low as the historically decisive role of the agricultural sector in rural water
management has declined.
Further analysis of the LSA enables the definition of sub-arenas of a limited
number of actors and a limited number of issues including a relatively large potential
for exchange of control. This analytic information can be used to design the decision
making process in such a way that interaction in the policy arena is concentrated
in these sub-arenas and the likelihood of identifying profitable exchanges of control
increases. This focused attention can possibly result in alternatives that are not only
substantially interesting but also fit the interest of the participating actors and are
therefore more promising for further decision-making. This combination of content
and process in the transactional approach comprises an interesting focus for further
development of the method and extension of the workshop design.
The application of the transactional approach to the rural water management
policy arena in The Netherlands showed that it is possible to structure and quantify
the linear system of action in an interactive setting. It also appeared that the
participants could grasp the concepts used and accepted the transactional approach
as the starting point for a discussion on dependency relations. Some participants find
it difficult to comprehend the way the transactional approach incorporates formal
politics through the subjective perceptions of the actors in the policy arena. Trough
the discussion of decision-making in terms of dependency relations the transactional
approach contributes to the process of decision making by increasing the participants
understanding of their dependency position. Further analytic use of the linear system
J. Timmermans
of action, has the potential to delivers valuable advice for future decision-making and
increases our understanding of policy development for rural water management in
general.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
Appendix: The LSA and the Calculation of Equilibrium Control
In the LSA, there are two sets of elements, one referring to the decision makers
i (i = 1, . . . , n) and the other to the issues j ( j = 1, . . . , m). Decision maker i has
control cij over issue j and interest x ji in issue j. Decision makers maximize utilities
in accordance with a Cobb–Douglas-type utility function:
Ui = cx1ii1 cx2ii2 ....cxmiim
where Ui is the total utility of decision maker i, cij is the amount of control over issue
j held by decision maker i and x ji expresses the contribution of this amount of control
over issue j to Ui. In the Cobb–Douglas-type utility function, we have:
n∑
j=1
xji = 1 and all xji ≥ 0
Let C be the matrix of control, with entries cij and let X be the matrix of interest
with x ji. Both X and C are scaled arbitrarily and are normalized so that:
m∑
i=1
cij = 1 and
n∑
j=1
X ji = 1 and xji ≥ 0 and cij ≥ 0
The matrix of equilibrium control C*, where the entry cij*, stands for the equilib-
rium control of decision maker i over issue j, can be calculated as C* = Dr X ′ D−1v .
The matrix Dr is a diagonal matrix with elements ri and the matrix Dv is a diagonal
matrix with elements v j.
The power vector r, with elements ri, and the value vector v, with elements v j, can
be calculated as
r = (I − CX + En)−1 en1 and v = (I − XC + Em)−1 em1
where En is a square matrix with elements 1/n, Em is a square matrix with elements
1/m and the vectors en1 and em1 are defined as n × 1 and m× 1 columns from these
matrices; I is the identity matrix.
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